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The Corporate Strategic Planning Process
The corporate strategic planning process is a disciplined and well-defined
organizational effort aimed at the complete specification of corporate strategy.
In the words of Andrews (1980):
Corporate strategy is the pattern of decisions in a company that
determines and reveals its objectives, purposes, or goals, produces
the principal policies and plans for achieving those goals, and
defines the range of business the company is to pursue, the
kind of economic and human organization it is or intends to be,
and the nature of the economic and noneconomic contribution it
intends to make to its shareholders, employees, customers, and
communitites... [It] defines the businesses in which a company
will compete, preferably in a way that focuses resources to convey
distinctive competences into competitive advantages.
It is a complex matter to describe this process in general terms. We need to
identify not only the major tasks that have to be addressed in setting up
corporate strategy, and the sequence in which they must be completed, but also
the assignment of responsibilities for the execution of those tasks.
There are many hierarchical planning levels that depend very heavily upon
the diversity of businesses of the firm, its organizational structure, and the
interrelationship between strategy and structure. It becomes clear, then, that
the precise specification of a corporate strategic planning process depends on
the particular characteristics of the situational setting confronted by the
firm. The planning process appropriate for a single business firm with a purely
functional organizational structure is quite different from the one suitable
for addressing the strategic tasks of a highly diversified multinational corpora-
tion. However, we believe that there are some common properties whose adequate
use can help in delineating the formal planning process for most business firms.
At the risk of being overly simplisitic, we will go back to basics. In
Figure 1 we have identified three conceptual hierarchical levels, which have
always been recognized as the essential layers of any corporate planning process:
a corporate, a business, and a functional level.
Regarding the nature of the planning tasks, we believe it is important to
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distinguish, first, some activities which have a more permanent character.
Although planning is a continuous process which is repeated year in and year
out in the life of an organization, there are certain basic conditions that seem
to be more permanent and are not significantly altered in each planning cycle.
We have referred to them as the structural conditioners of the business firm
and thus are represented in Figure 1 by the vision of the firm, and the mission
of the business.
At the same time, there are three major tasks which need to be updated and
revised at every planning cycle: strategy formulation, strategic programming,
and strategic and operational budgeting.
The essence of the message portrayed in Figure 1 is that corporate planning
is neither a top-down nor a bottom-up nrocess. It is a much more complex activity
which requires a strong participation of the key managers of the firm, where objec-
tives are being proposed from the top, and specific pragmatic alternatives are
being suggested from business and functional levels. It is a process that,
properly conducted, generates a wealth of individual commitments and personal
participation from everybody who has a definitive say in sharpening up the
direction of the firm. It is a rich communication device,. where the key managers
have an opportunity to voice their personal beliefs about the conduct of busi-
nesses of the firm, and offers a valuable joint experience as well as an educa-
tional opportunity to be shared by key participants.
We provide now a brief description of the content of the corporate strategic
planning steps identified in Figure 1.
Step 1: The Vision of the Firm
The vision of the firm is a rather permanent statement articulated primarily
by ts Chief Executive Officer, addressing the- folowing- issues:
1) Communicate the very nature of existence of the organization in terms of
corporate purpose, business scope,-and competitive leadership;
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2) .provide a framework that regulates the relationships between the firm and
its primary stakeholders: employees, customers, shareholders, suppliers,
and the communities in which the firm operates;
3) state the broad objectives of the firm's performance in terms of growth
and profitability.
The mission of the firm has to be expressed so as to provide a unifying theme
and a vital challenge to all organizational units, communicate a sense of achiev-
able ideals, serve as a source of inspiration for confronting the daily activities,
and become a contagious and motivating guiding force congruent with the corporate
ethic and values.
The vision is a statement of basic principles that set apart those firms
which have been able to articulate it in a positive manner from those which lag
behind in this respect. There are very few firms which can show well-defined
statements of mission.
An individual working for a firm has to become an active collaborator in
the pursuit of the corporate purposes; he must share the vision of the firm and
feel comfortable with the way in which it is translated or expressed in tradi-
tions and values. The behavior of individuals is conditioned by this framework
and they must intimately sense that, by following these guidelines, they are
fulfilling their most personal needs for achievement. The vision of the firm
is a personal drive for their own lives.
Though the vision of the firm is a central thrust for a smooth development
of corporate concerns, it is very hard to state it in unambiguous and pragmatic
terms, and explain what it takes to develop and communicate the sense of vision.
But the prop~c realization of corporate strategic planning requires, as a first
step, that a statement of the vision of the firm be issued. We believe that
three major components should be present in such a statement:
1) an expression of the mission of the firm in terms of product, market, and
geographical scope; and a statement of the way to achieve competitive leader-
III
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ship;
2) the identification of the strategic business units (SBU's) of the firm and
their interactions in terms of shared resources and shared concerns;
3) an articulation of the corporate philosophy in terms of corporate policies
and cultural values.
The Mission of the Firm
A primary information that should be contained in a statement of mission
is a clear definition of current and future expected business scope. This is
expressed as a broad description of the products, markets, and geographical
coverage of the business today and within a reasonably short time frame, commonly
three to five years. The statement of business scope is informative not only
for what it includes; it is equally telling for what it leaves out.
The specification of current and future product, market, and geographic
business scope communicates the degree of permanence that the business is expected
to have. In a widely popular article, Leavitt (1960) warns against excessive
marketing myopia. The essence of his message is to allow for a broad enough
definition of business scope in order to detect changes in the industry trends,
the repositioning of competitors in terms of products, markets, and geographical
coverage, and the availability of new substitutes. The contrast between current
and future scope is an effective diagnostic tool to warn against myopic position-
ing of the.business.
An example of a mission statement which clearly communicates the three
dimensions of the business scope is provided by the Automotive and.Industrial
Electronics Group of Motorola:
- The mission of the Automotive and Industrial Electronics Group is
the development and production of electronic modules and power conversion
equipment for sale to original equipment manufacturers (EMs) and the
associated replacement parts market.
The product scope centers on volume production of electronic modules,
in a variety of manufacturing technologies, for monitoring, control,
information transmission, information display, and power conversion.
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The market scope is the OEM and replacement market segment for
instrumentation, electronic power conversion systems, wire line
communication equipment, vehicle power trains, appliances, OE passenger
car entertainment, and systems refining visual display capabilities.
The geographic scope is primarily North America and Europe, and
secondarily Japan, Latin America, and South Africa.
The other important piece of information that should be contained in the
mission statement of a business is the selection of a way to pursue a position
of either leadership or sustainable competitive advantage. In this respect,
we find Emhart's corporate mission statement to be unambiguously clear:
The businesses within the Company are expected to achieve and
maintain a leadership position in attractive industries. A true
leadership position means having a significant and well-defined
advantage over all competitors. This can be achieved through
continuous, single-minded determination to achieve one or both of
the following positions within an industry:
1. Lowest Delivered Cost Position
A business with the lowest delivered cost has greater economies
of scale than other competitors. Economies of scale are avail-
able in the manufacturing, distribution and installation steps
where large amounts of costs are incurred. Success at achieving
the position of lowest delivered cost is dependent upon identify-
ing and concentrating upon that step where a concentration of
effort will produce the most dramatic results.
2. Differentiated Products
Differentiated products are those which offer the customer some
important and unique benefit. Typically, patents, trademarks,
brand names or specialized skills prevent competitors from copy-
ing such products. If a product is truly differentiated, the
customer is selectively insensitive to price. Increasing
customer price sensitivity is a sign that a product is losing
its advantage of differentiation.
Business Segmentation
The cornerstone of the strategic planning process is the segmentation
of the firm's activities in terms of business units. One of the first
questions to be addressed sounds deceptively simple, but in practice repre-
sents a most uhallenging and creative analysis: What businesses are we in?
-A business can be defined as an operating unit or a planning focus that
sells a distinct set of products or services to an identifiable group of
customers in competition with a well defined set of competitors. The resulting
entity is normally referred to as a strategic business unit, or SBU for short.
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It constitutes the level of analysis where most of the strategic planning effort
is centered.
Rothschild (1980), a manager of Corporate Strategy Development and Integra-
tion at G.E., has listed the following criteria to be met before.; an organizational
component is classified as an SBU:
- First of all, an SBU must serve an external, rather than an internal,
market; that is, it must have a set of external customers and not
merely serve as an internal supplier or opportunistic external supplier.
- Second, it should have a clear set of external competitors which is
trying to equal or surpass.
- Third, it should have control over its own destiny. This means that
it must be able to decide by itself what products to offer, how and
when to go to market, and where to obtain its suppliers, components,
or even products. This does not mean.that it cannot use pooled
resources, such as a common manufacturing plant, or a combined sales
force, or even corporate R&D. The key is choice. It must be able
to choose and not merely be the victim of someone else's decision.
It must have options from which it may select the alternative(s) that
best achieves the corporate and its business objectives.
- Fourth, its performance must be measurable in terms of profits and
losses; that is, it must be a true pofit-center.
No organization is a pure SBU, but most SBUs should meet most of these
criteria, and all must meet the third one.
A similar notion has been espoused by Arthur D. Little, Inc. (ADL) which
defines an SBU as a business area with an external marketplace for goods and
services, whose objectives can be defined and strategies executed independently
of other business areas. It is a unit that could stand alone if divested from
the corporation.
ADL's. segmentation criteria is based primarily on conditions determined by
the external market place rather than production-cost linkages (e.g., common
manufacturing facilities), technical linkages (e.g., common technology), or
common distribution channels. They suggest that an SBU is a collection of products
and markets that face the same set of competitors, are similarly affected by
changes in price, are satisfying a single set of customers, are equally impacted
by changes in quality and style, are composed by products which-are substitutes
of one another, and can be divested without affecting other businesses of the
corporation.
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In the earlier stages of the application of the SBU concept, the trend was
to identify business units which constitute independent viable activities. An
important exception to the applicability of this definition is the business firm
primarily engaged in a single or dominant business activity with a functional
organizational structure. This is a prevalent situation in small enterprises,
and it is commonly observed in medium and large size organizations in process
oriented industries characterized by high levels of vertical integration.
However, our inabiliyt to establish autonomous entities in those cases does
not preclude the firm to engage in a plurality of external markets, each one
possessing very distinct opportunities and demanding very different competitive
efforts. We have to manage a situation in which there is no easy matching
between the organizational structure and the strategic focus for different busi-
nesses.
A second important exception to the definition of independent business units
is the firm which, indeed, can be broken into highly distinct businesses but,
if those units were to be managed in a totally autonomous way, unacceptable
inefficiencies would result. Very often, a proper strategy should address two
primary dimensions among distinct but related business units: shared resources
and shared concerns. We can identify situations where different units, in
order to be run effectively, have to share some manufacturing facilities or
other functional support. Ignoring these potentials will deprive the organiza-
tion of significant benefits to be derived from shared experiences and economies
of scale. The other form of interrelationship that can be found among distinct
business units is the existence of shared concerns, like common geographical
areas and keyriustomer accounts.
--The identification of shared resources opportunities can be based on the
value-added chain which covers all the managerial stages relatedto aproduct, from
product development to delivery of the finished product to the final customer.
Now we can apply the experience-'curve effect, not only to the final product,
III
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but to every stage in the value-added chain, opening new avenues for increased
efficiency when businesses share various forms of functional support. ax and
Maluf (1982a). A typisal value-added chain covers the followin- steps.
Product rocess Purchasing TransporatlollInufacturing1
1f Raw of Raw i Parts and
R&D R&D Materals Materials Components Aosembly Testing Marketing Sales D istribution Retailing
A simple procedure to diagnose the potentials for shared resources among
various business units is to construct a two-dimensional matrix for the appro-
priate stages for value added and business units of the firm. In each of the
resulting cells, a comment can be made on the.nature of the potential sharing
of resources, if any.
The Different Hierarchical Levels of Planning
The considerations that we have just expressed have raised some important
issues' with regard to the conventional way of managing businesses. Gluck,
Kaufman, and Walleck (1982) characterized the definition of an SBU structure
as a type of chicken-and-egg problem:
You can only really know the proper definition of an SBU when you
have an agreed strategy; different strategic thrusts require the
inclusion of different product-market units and functional capa-
bilities within the SBU. But one purpose of the SBU strategy is to
provide a framework for planning. Which came first, strategy or
structure?
Second, in most companies the planning structure is force-fitted
into the current organizational structure, -or the other way around.
Both are equally unsatisfactory. The planning structure should be
shaped around tomorrow's concepts of the business. An organizational
·structure is responsible for instrumenting today's strategies well;
when the two are different, conflict is inevitable.
It should not be surprising, therefore, that no one has been able
to prescribe an entirely acceptable definition of an SBU, or describe
satisfactorily how to derive an SBU structure. SBU definition
remains something of a black art...
In this excerpt, Gluck et al. refer to a situation in which the formal
organization structure cannot be logically mapped with. the business segmenta-
tion scheme, which is one of the two conditions that invalidates the definition
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of an SBU as autonomous business unit to which we alluded in the previous section.
Their proposal for resolving this problem is to develop a comprehensive strategic
planning framework which defines a hierarchy of planning levels composed by five
different layers:
- Corporate-Level Planning
To establish the vision of the firm, state corporate objectives and strategic
thrusts, define a corporate philosophy and values, identify a domain in which
the firm will operate, recognize world-wide technical and market trends, and
allocate resources with a sense of corporate priorities.
- Share-Concern Planning
To meet unique needs of certain industry or geography customer groups or to
plan for technologies used by a number of business units.
- Shared Resource Planning
To achieve economies of scale or to avoid problems of subcritical mass (e.g.,
R&D). Whenever a critical resource resides on a function centralized at
the corporate level, the development of that functional strategy could be
critically important to either determine or constrain a business unit strategy.
- Business-Unit Planning
Business units are defined having external markets and competitors in mind.
Host of the strategic planning effort is done at this level, where the business
unit manager seeks control of its own market position and cost structure.
- Product-Market Planning
The lowest level at which strategic planning takes place, where typically
product, price, sales, and services are planned.
From theprospective of this framework, the essential task is to identify
what are the issues to be faced by each hierarchical level, and what is the
role that they have to play in shaping corporate, business, and functional
strategy. Also, individual responsibilities for developing, implementing, and
controlling the proper strategic tasks have to be assigned at all levels in
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the organization.
By adopting this way of resolving the dilemma between strategy and structure,
we are de facto admitting that there could be two coexistent types of organiza-
tions within the firm. One, the formal organizational structure, is designed
to deal in an effective manner with the on-going operational tasks, and
requires a clearly spelled out hierarchy of responsibilities and authorities
allowing little or no reporting ambiguity. The other, the strategic structure,
has its own reporting system according to the hierarchical strategic levels
we just described. Many managers assume dual roles: operational and strategic,
and therefore are measured and rewarded by a dual control system. In the termi-
nology of Texas Instruments, these individuals wear "two hats".
There is also no ambiguity in the strategic reporting structure except that it
might not coincide with the operational reporting mechanism. As far as we know, General
Electric which was the first organization to adopt formally this dual operational and
strategic approach to structuring an organization [Harvard Business School (1981)].
The second condition we have identified in the previous section that limits
the definition of SBUs as autonomous entities applies to firms which, though
clearly segmented in accordance with largely self-contained business units, do
share significant resources and concerns among them.
A very popular way of resolving this issue has been to interpose a new hier-
archical level in the organizational structure, normally referred to as group
or sector. It represents a collection of distinct but interrelated business
units which share resources and/or concerns and, therefore, cannot state
strategic plans in a completely independent fashion.
The group or sector management fulfills many roles: it serves as a buffer
between the corporate and business levels; it assists in the translation of
corporate objectives, thrusts, and planning challenges for the participating
SBUs; it assures that the adequate resources and concerns are properly dealt
with and developed by business units; and it coordinates the strategic. and
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operational activities pertaining to SBUs.
Two additional tasks conducted by group managers in some organizations
are the allocation of resources among SBUs and the extension of existing busi-
nesses into new and related product-market segments. This is particularly true
in firms such as General Electric, where the various sectors are differentiated
by type of industry. The corporate level lacks an intimate knowldge of the
wide array of businesses spanning a broad spectrum of industries, so it delegates
to group executives what actually is the management of a fairly complex segment
of the corporation, but it retains the responsibility for diversification oppor-
tunities into new industries not covered by existing groups.
Corporate Philosophy
This is the most subtle of the issues involved in shaping up the corporate
vision. A well-formulated corporate philosophy should address, at least, the
following issues:
1) Statement of the relationship between the firms and its principal stake-
holders; namely employees, customers, shareholders, suppliers, communities.
2) Definition of broad corporate objectives, normally expressed in terms of
growth and profitability.
3) Formulation of corporate policies, regarding organizational policies, human
resources management (selection, promotion, compensation, rotation), finan-
cial policies (particularly in terms of dividends and debt structure), market-
ing policies, and technologies policies.
4) An articulation of the corporate culture reflected' in its attitudes and
values, its management style, and the problem-solving behavior of its people.
Step 2: Strategic Posture and Planning Guidelines
The corporate vision is a rather permanent statement of the central purpose
of the organization, its policies and corporate values. Normally, it is not
updated at the beginning of each planning cycle but it is subject to a thorough
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review at much longer intervals, say every five years or so. However, the
vision has to be translated into more pragmatic and concrete guidelines which
serve as immediate challenges for the development of strategic proposals at
the businesses and major functions of the firm.
This latter set of concerns is encapsulated in what we designate as the
strategic posture of the firm, which has to be distilled from the vision of the
firm and the situational analysis of the external and internal environments.
In Figure 2, we represent these interactions and indicate the primary elements
in these strategic activities.
a) Environmental Scan at the Corporate Level
Environmental scan attempts to diagnose the general health of the industrial
sectors relevant to the businesses in which the corporation is engaged. It
concentrates on assessing the overall economic, political, technological, and
social climates that affects the corporation as a whole. This assessment has
to be coiducted, first, from an historical perspective to determine how well
the corporation has mobilized its resources to meet the challenges presented by
the external environment; and then, with a futuristic view in mind, to forecast
future trends in the environment and seek a repositioning of the internal
resources to adapt the organization to those environmental trends.
The output of the environmental scan normally starts with an economic
scenario which exhibits the most likely.trends affecting the next planning cycle
and, possibly, a call for the development-of contingency plans addressing either
optimistic or pessimistic departures from this most likely trend. Topics to
be included in this economic scenario are: 
- economic growth: GNP and major influencing factors
- inflation rate
- prime interest rate
- unemployment
- overview of foreign markets, and foreign exchange rates considerations
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Figure 2: The Vision of the Firm and Its Strategic Posture
/
- population growth in critical geographical areas
- disposable income
- growth of critical industrial sectors, such as housing, defense, health, etc.
A second important component of the environmental scan is the projection of
global trends in the primary markets in which the firm competes. Although a more
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detailed industry and competitive analysis has to be conducted at the business
level, it is important to provide some macro-trends mutually agreed upon by
corporate officers and key business managers in order to assure a sense of overall
consistency in the formulation of business strategy and actual programs.
For a firm competing in a high-technology environment, an essential third
ingredient of the environmental scanning process is a thorough analysis of the
change of pace of emerging technologies and the threats and opportunities this
situation creates to the firm.
Besides economic, market, and technological considerations, a question that
deserves special attention is the availability and quality of the supply of human
resources. For some firms, this is the most critical and constraining resource.
Therefore, it is essential to understand the composition and trends of specially
critical professional and technical skills.
Finally, the environmental scan has to address a set of more subtle but, at
time, crucial issues pertaining to the political, social, and legal environments.
Concrete items which are central to most business firms are regulatory issues,
question of unionization, minority concerns, environmentalists pressures, public
opinion groups; community activities, etc.
b) Internal SCrutiny at the Corporate Level
The subject of the internal scrutiny at the corporate level is concerned with
a broad evaluation of the human, financial, productive, physical, and technological
resources available to the corporation. As with the environmental scan, the
analysis has to include the historical background as well as the forecasted trends.
What is intended to be distilled from the internal scrutiny at the corporate
level is the identification of the major areas of competence existing across the
organization which are going to be exploited to achieve a position of leadership.
A tool which could be useful to reflect upon the primary thrust of the firm
is what Tregoc and Zimmerman (1980) designate as the driving force. According
to their definition, a driving force is. a central determinant of chalnges in the
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mission of the firm; i.e., in its product, market, and geographical scope. ley
suggest that there are nine basic strategic areas, grouped in three broad cate-
gories, all of which can decisively affect and influence the nature and direction
of any organization (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Driving Force and the Nine Basic Strategic Areas
Category Strategic Areas
Product/Markets Products Offered
Market Needs
Capabilities Technology
Production Capability
Method of Sale
Method of Distribution
Natural Resources
Results Size-Growth
Return-Profits
Tregoe and Zimmerman suggest that, although all nine strategic areas are
critically important to every-company, one and only one of the nine areas should
be the driving force fot the total organization. Likewise, for any business
unit within the organization, there should be only one driving force, though
not necessarily the same as in the total organization. Moreover, the driving
force might change as the organization modifies its strategic posture through
time, due to changes in the environment, in the competitive picture, in internal
capabilities, and in the desire of top management.
The strategic areas identified under the category "capabilities" represent
driving forces which are supported by some special kind of functional excellence,
while the others address broader issues of business concerns.
c) The Strategic Posture of the Firm
. The strategic posture of the firm is a set of pragmatic requirements developed
at the corporate level to guide the formulation of business and functional strategies.
This is accomplished through the formulation of the corporate strategic thrusts,
the identification of specific planning challenges for the corporation, businesses
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and functional areas, and the statement of corporate performance objectives.
Corporate Strategic Thrusts
The corporate strategic thrusts constitute a powerful mechanism to translate
the broad sense of directions the organization wants to follow into a practical
set of instructives to all key managers involved in the strategic process. We
define strategic thrusts as the primary issues the firm has to address during
the next three to five years to establish a healthy competitive position in the
key markets in which it participates.
Strategic thrusts should contain specific and meaningful planning challenges
for each of the business units of the firm. In addition, depending on the nature
of the organizational structure, the strategic thrusts could also contain challenges
addressed at the corporate level as well as some key centralized functions.
The mere process of collective reflection upon the strategic thrusts by
a group of top managers represent a major advance in the strategic thinking of the
firm. This process generates the listing of the primary issues faced by the firms,
and the assignment of priorities and identification of responsible individuals in
charge of responding to the strategic thrusts. On the surface, it may sound as a
relatively simple and straightforward exercise. This if far from being the case.
The development of the strategic thrust permits raising the central questions
the firm should address for a meaningful strategic development.
There is a significant power in the actions that are set in motion by the
definition of strategic thrusts. Regardless of the individual concerns and
situational issues residing at every level in the organization, we know that
those managers who have been entrusted with the responsibility of responding
to strategic thrusts will have to produce proper answers to those questions,
mobilizing every unit in the organization in- the desired overall direction.
This provides an opportunity for all competences and talents in the organization
to be thoroughly applied in the pursuit of clearly established lines of action.
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Figure 4 illustrates in a very succinct way the statement of strategic thrusts
for a manufacturing firm, as well as the assignment of planning challenges to those
organizational levels in charge of responding to th6se thrusts. Notice that there
is a priority assigned to those planning challenges, depending on the level of
intensity of the necessary participation required. We have formulated these
thrusts very concisely. It could be beneficial, in a given situation, to expand
the description of each thrust to allow for a better communication of the issues
that are intended to be covered.
Figure 4: Statement of Strategic Thrusts and Assignment of Planning Challenges
BUSINESSES FUNCTIONS
STRATEGIC THRUSTS CORP SBU-1 I SBU-2 SBU-3 ANUF TECH.
Reduce production costs - 1 1 3 1 2
Improve product quality - 2 1 1 1 2
Develop new products 2 3 1 1 3 1
Increase penetration in key accounts i 1 2 2 - -
Increase internation participation 1 3 2 1 - -
Seek diversification outside
existing business base
Improve customer service - 1 3 2 - 2
Code: 1 Vital
2 Important
3 Secondary
- Not applicable
Corporate Performance Objectives
Normally, the expression of corporate objectives are quantitative indicators
related to the overall financial performance of the firm. Typically, corporations
choose to express corporate financial objectives via a very limited number of
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selected indicators related to total revenues, profit performance, and growth
rate.
There is no universal set of indicators used for these purposes. Moreover,
the financial targets could be quite different among firms, depending both on
external market opportunities and the external competences of the firm.
Various considerations serve as a base to arrive at a numerical expression
of goals. First, the historical performance achieved by the corporation; second,
the projected trends expected from the existing and new business lines; and
third, the financial position of the firm competitors. It is important to
recognize the financial performance of the key competitors not only from the
perspective of comparative analysis, but also because firms in the same industry
attract the same group of investors in the capital markets.
By articulating broad financial expectations, the corporation adds to the
challenges implicit in the strategic thrusts but, at the same time, provides a
more realistic framework to guide the desirability of proposed action programs
that will emerge from the subsequent steps in the strategic planning process.
Step 3: The Mission of the Business
The basic concept of mission of the business is similar to its equivalent
at the corporate level, and is expressed in terms of products, market and
geographical scope, together with a statement of competitive uniquess. However,
when applied at the business level, the mission becomes sharper and more
detailed. There is a strong influence emanating from the corporate vision
and posture statements. However, it is possible that the existing or desirable
competitive leadership of a given business might not coincide with that of the
overall corporation.
Step 4: Formulation of Business Stratey and Broad Action Programs
A business strategy is a set of well-coordinated action programs aimed at
securing a long-term sustainable competitive advantage.
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Prior to the development of strategies for the individual businesses, it
is necessary to perform a thorough analysis regarding the current and future
business position in terms of two dimensions:
- the non-controllable forces which are associated with the external environment
and determine the industry trends and market opportunities; and
- the internal competences residing in the firm, which will determine the unique
competitive leadership potential that the firm could mobilize in order to
establish a business superiority against competitors.
The business strategy constitutes a response to deal with these two dimen-
sions. When addressing the external environment, the strategic orientation will
try to take advantage of market opportunities and neutralize adverse environ-
mental impacts; when facing the internal environment, the direction will be to
reinforce internal strengths and improve upon perceived weaknesses with regard
to competition. Moveover, the business strategy should be guided by directions-
provided by the corporate level, most importantly those expressed by the strate-
gic thrusts which generate specific planning challenges for the business under
consideration-(see Figure 5).
During the late 1960's and throughout the 1970's, a planning methodology
known as the business portfolio approach was developed to assist managers in
addressing these two dimensions of strategic diagnosis. Among them, the most
popular are:
- The growth-share matrix, originally developed by the Boston Consulting Group
(BCG). Henderson and Zakon (1980a), Hax and Majluf (1982b).
- The industry attractiveness-business strength matrix, originally developed
by General-lectric jointly with McKinsey: Rothschild (1976), Allen (1979),
Hax and Majluf (1982c).
- The life-cycle approach, developed by Arthur D. Little: Arthur D. Little (1979),
Osell and Wright (1980).
Recent analyses of the various portfolio management techniques have been
III
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Figure 5: Formulation of Business Strategy and Broad Action Programs
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The first proposal of generic strategies come from the BCG approach, which
relies on desirable market share positioning as a primary input to convey the
strategic objectives for a business unit. The categories of market share thrusts
initially defined by BCG are:
- Increase
- Hold
-Harvest
- Withdraw or Divest.
Macmillan (1982) expands the strategic roles which could be played by a
business unit depending on its position in the portfolio matrix. They are:
- Build aggressively
- Build gradually
- Build selectively
- Maintain agressively
- Maintain selectively
- Prove viability
- Divest, liquidate
- Competitive harasser.
Step 5: Formulation of Functional Strategies and Broad Action Programs
The intensity of the functional participation at this stage of the planning
process depends strongly on the characteristics of the organizational structure
of the firm. If a firm is heavily decentralized, with strong self-sufficient
divisionalized businesses, the role of the functional manager at this step is
minimum, since the strategy formulation at the business level incorporates all
the necessary functional support. Conversely, a purely functional organization,
or a hybrid organization having some strong centralized functional presence,
will require a much stronger participation of the functional managers in the
formulation of strategies.
-23-
There are two forms of functional involvement at this step. One, a
relatively passive participation, calls for the functional managers to study
the business strategies and broad action programs prepared by businesses and
cast a concurrence or non-concurrence vote. If functional managers decide that
a business plan is not acceptable because it is judged to contain inadequate
or unrealistic commitments in some functional area, the corresponding functional
manager will issue a non-concurrence statement. Most of the non-concurrences
should be resolved through bi-lateral discussions between business and
functional managers. If agreement is not reached, the non-concurrence issue
escalates through the organizational hierarchy until it is finally resolved.
This planning mode has been adopted by IBM [Harvard Business School (1979)].
The second form of functional involvement is the response that a functional
manager has to provide to the corporate strategic thrust, which involves directly
his particular function, and it is not contained in any proposed business plan.
Normally, actions of this sort represent requirements for increasing the
existing competences of a given function in order to create a unique competi-
tive strength, to be transferred in the future to the various businesses of
the firm.
These functional responses to strategic thrusts are expressed in terms
of broad action programs, containing multi-year milestones, and expressed in
fairly aggregate terms. They will, in turn, be supported by a set of specific
action programs later on in the planning process.
In the formulation of broad action programs, it might be useful to resort to
and environmental scan and internal scrutiny processes, similar to those discussed
at the business level, except that this time the focus of attention is the actual
standing and proper development of functional capabilities in the firm.
Step 6: Consolidation of Business and Functional Strategies at the Corporate Level
This crucial step in the planning process calls for a critical review and
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sanctioning at the corporate level of the set of broad action programs proposed
by business and functional managers. It requires the involvement of all key
executives who share the responsibility of shaping the strategic direction of
the firm, and it is conducted normally through a one or two-day meeting, totally
dedicated for this purpose. If properly done, it serves as a powerful communica-
tion device which allows for the emergence of a clear consensus and a personal
commitment of all participating managers.
At a minimum, the following five issues should be addressed at this step.
1) Preliminary evaluation of the quality of the proposed broad action
programs. The broad action programs developed by business and functional managers
in previous steps are supported by the gathering of market and business "intelli-
gence", and represent a rather qualitative set of proposals which are believed
to mobilize the businesses in the desired future direction. Usually, there
is little of precise quantitative information in these proposals. Notoriously
absent at this point is a comprehensive quantitative analysis of the financial
implications of the proposed recommended action programs, as well as additional
alternatives that can be revised at this point. These financial analyses
require much more detailed information, which would be collected in subsequent
stages, once an approved broad direction has been selected.
By doing so, we eliminate the frustrations which result from wasting
significant amounts of effort to present strategic alternatives that might be
turned down later at the corporate level. However, this leaves us with a
difficult question to be resolved: how to really assess the merits of the
proposals at this stage?
To some~ixtent, this is not an unfortunate situation because, purposely, we
do not want to be bogged down with massive amounts of data which will cloud
the real issues to be resolved at this step. What is central for this discussion
is to have a clear understanding of the integrity of the set of broad action
programs as a way of effectively developing the businesses and functions of-
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the firm. That integrity cannot be grasped by simple numerical exercises.
The acid test is the extent by which the programs truly respond to the strategic
thrusts previously elaborated, and their congruency with the vision of the firm.
2) Resolution of non-concurrence conflicts. If bilateral discussions under-
taken by business and functional managers to resolve a non-concurrence issue has
not resulted in a satisfactory solution, the issue could escalate at this level,
where it has to be finally resolved. Depending on the nature of the problem
as well as the organizational style, we might not want to address publicly and
openly this conflict at the managers' meeting. In this case, efforts should be
undertaken to resolve the questions prior to the meeting and merely report on
the final decision.
3) Balancing the business portfolio of the firm. This activity spans several
dimensions of concern. The most crucial one has to be with short-term profit-
ability vs. long-term development. To some extent, that is also linked to the
trade-offs between risk and return. Finally there is a question of cash-flow
balance, which does not imply that a balanced-portfolio is necessarily optimum,
but it serves to address the question of seeking some equilibrium between
sources and uses of funds in the organization.
4) Defining the availability of strategic funds, the debt policy, and the
maximum sustainable growth. Strategic funds are expense items required for
the implementation of strategic action programs whose benefits are expected to
be accrued in the long-term, beyond the current budget period (Stonich, 1980).
There are three major components of strategic funds:
--Investment in tangible assets,- such as new production capacity, new machinery
and tools, new vehicles for distribution, new office space, new warehouse
space, and new acquisitions.
Increases or decreases in working capital resulting fm.. 0s`trag coŽr.-itm.ents,
such as the impact of increases of inventories and receivables resulting from
an increase in sale; the need to accumulate larger inventories to provide
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better services; increasing receivables resulting from a different policy
of loans to customers, etc.
- Development expenses, that are over and above the needs of existing business,
such as advertising to introduce a new product or to reposition an existing
one; R&D expenses of new products; major cost reduction programs for existing
programs; introductory discounts, sales promotions, and free samples to stimu-
late first purchases; development of management systems such as planning,
control, compensations; certain engineering studies, etc.
It is important to recognize these three forms of strategic funds. Although
all of them contribute to the same purpose, namely, the improvement of future
capabilities of the firm, financial accounting rules treat these three items
quite differently. Investment is shown as increase in net assets in the balance
sheet, and as annual expenses through depreciation in the profit and loss
statement. Increases in working capital also enlarge the net assets of the
firm, but they have no annual cost repercussion. Development expenses are
charged as expenses in the current year income statement and are not added to
assets as investments. These considerations suggest that dysfunctional behavior
may result on the part of business managers if they are unwilling to commit
themselves to significant strategic expenses whenever they are monitored and
rewarded by inappropriately myopic management control systems. Since there
are no immediate profitability results derived from these strategic funds, it
is important to make a manager accountable for the proper and timely allocation
of those expenditures using performance measurements related to the inherent
characteristics of the action programs they are attempting to support.
A sound way of calculating the strategic funds is first to forecast the
sources of funds forthcoming to the firm. The primary components of the
sources of funds are:
- earnings
- depreciation
- new debt issuing
- new equity issuing
- divestitures.
Notice that earnings contain, as part of the cost of goods sold, the normal levels
of development expenses which are assigned to the various functions of the organi-
zation, in particular R&D.
The second part of the computation requires the forecast of uses of funds,
who most important items are:
- dividends
- debt repayment (principal)
- strategic funds
- new fixed assets and acquisitions
- - increases in working capital
- increases in development expenses.
Therefore, the total strategic funds (S.F.) availability can be estimated as:
total S.F. total dividend debt
availability source of funds payments repayment
It is apparent from this relation that the firm debt capacity and financial lever-
age policies have a significant impact in the ability of the firm to increase its
growth. Establishing a sound debt policy, congruent with the company's financing
requirements, it is another issue to be addressed at this point. A good treat-
ment of this topic is presented by Piper and Weinhold (1982).
Another useful guide to address the question of corporate growth is the
clculation of the maximum sustainable growth of the firm. This represents the
maximum growth the firm can support by using its internal resources as well as
its debt capacity. A relation proposed by Zakon (1976) to estimate this limit
to company growth is:
g - p[ROA + (ROA - i)]
__ 
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where: g maximum sustainable growth expressed as a yearly rate of increase
of the equity base. (It corresponds also to the increase in the
total assets base, because the debt-equity ratio is assumed to
remain constant.)
p percentage of retained earnings
ROA = after-tax return on assets
D = total debt outstanding
E ? total equity
i = after-tax interest of debt.
This expression represents a first cut and gross approximation of the maximum
sustainable growth, that assumes a stable debt-equity ratio and dividend-payout
policy, as well as a fixed overall rate of return on assets, and cost of debt.
Although a coarse approximation, this number serves as a guidance for corporate
growth that should be taken into consideration at the corporate level.
5) Assigning priorities for resource allocation to each business unit.
The previous considerations have allowed us to assess the affordable growth
of the corporation and the total funds available for its future development.
Having that information in mind, we should now turn our attention to the assign-
ment of priorities to be given to each business unit in terms of resource alloca-
tion. This will allow a realistic program to be formulated, which not only will
respond properly to the desired strategic direction of each business unit, but
also it will be consistent with the financial and human resources in place.
There are various ways to establish those priorities. An adequate expression
could be to use the categories of strategic growth previously identified; ie.,
build aggressively, build gradually, build selectively, maintain aggressively,
maintain selectively, prove viability, divest-liquidate, competitive-harasser.
Steps 7 and 8: Definition and Evaluation of Specific Action Programs at the
Business and Functional Levels
The broad and qualitative statements of the strategy formulation phase
..
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have to be translated into concrete tasks which can be subjected to a close
monitoring, and whose contribution to the business can be measured in precise
quantitative terms. At this step of the planning process, specific action
programs spell out, with a clear implementation focus, the detailed tasks
which have to be undertaken to support each one of the broad action programs.
A specific action program is a structured, coherent, timed and evaluated
continuum of actions, with a clearly defined schedule for completion in a rela-
tively short time span covering, normally, from 6 to 18 months. In the military
terminology, they represent the tactical plans that support the strategy.
The definition of a specific action program must include:
- a verbal description
- a statement of priority indicating the desirability of the program for the
competitive position of the firm.
!!Absolute first priority" - postponement will hurt significantly the compe-
titive position.
"Highly desirable" - postponement will affect adversely the competitive position.
"Desirable" - if funds were to be available, the competitive position could be
enhanced.
- the estimated cost and benefits
- the manpower requirements
- the schedule of completion
- the identification of a single individual responsible for its implementation
- the procedure for controlling its execution (normally of the project-control
"'kind, like CPM and Gantt-schedules).
The inclusion of this normalized description of specific action programs
greatly facilitates their evaluation and sanctioning at the corporate level.
The final approval of these programs is partly based on a qualitative assess-
ment of the strategic positioning of the business or function supported by them,
partly on the resources availability to the firm and partly on quantitative
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measures of the goodness of the program obtained by using normal evaluation
techniques.
A distinctive characteristic of the evaluation process conducted at the
corporate level is its incremental nature. In fact, a specific action program
can be either added or eliminated depending on the importance and worth assigned
to it. The importance of the program is derived from the priority specified
in its definition, which amounts to the urgency assigned by the managers more
directly affected by it; and from the opinion held at the corporate level with
regard to the strategic value of the program for the related business or function.
The worth of the program is estimated based on the discounting of expected cash-
flow streams at rates which incorporate the business risk. This requires the
realization of a marginal analysis supported by market and financial forecasts
conditional upon the adoption of the program being proposed. Finally, it is
a common practice to address in the cash-flow projections different scenarios
that correspond to optimistic, most likely, and pessimistic assumptions. A
simple analytical procedure for evaluating specific action programs on an incre-
mental basis is suggested by Rappaport (1981).
Step 9: Resource Allocation and Definition of Performance Measurements for
Management Control
At this step of the planning process, top managers are confronted with the
difficult task of evaluating the proposals originated at the business and func-
tional levels with a corporate perspective, in order to assign the necessary
resources for their proper development. This is not an easy task for two main
reasons: one, the inherent difficulty in assigning meaningful priorities to
programs which are quite heterogeneous seeking the advancement of many different
objectives which make them hard to compare; and two, normally, the flow of
proposals contains resource requirements which, by far, exceed the total avail-
ability of resources residing in the entire organization. This often presents
Ill
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top managers with the unpleasant job of having to say no but, at the same time,
fully explaining the reasons for that decision without demotivating managers.
The resource allocation process begins with the determination of the total
funds available for supporting broad and specific action programs being presented
by businesses and functions during the actual planning cycle. This is done by
deducting from the total appropriated for investment, those funds which are
required to fulfill legal obligations or correspond to previous commitments
to an on-going project.
Another point of concern at the corporate level is the coherence between the
strategic role assigned to a business, and the one assumed by its managers.
Rothschild (1980) discusses a methodology developed by General Electric to check
the consistency between investment priorities and resource allbcation decisions.
It is based on recording and comparing the historical assignments and new demands
of strategic funds to detect the degree of aggressiveness implicit in the proposed
request s measured in terms of its deviation from the past. Declining, maintain-
ing, moderate increase, and aggressive increases of those requests- should be
congruent with the strategic directions these businesses are intended to pursue.
Otherwise, there is an inconsistency which needs explanation.
In recent years, there has been an increasing attention being given to the
concept of value creation as a way of assessing the goodness of the firm and
business strategies. Accepting as a primary objective for the firm the creation
of value to its shareholders, the question becomes how to measure the potential
for value creation implicit in the business and firm strategies. At the firm
level, there is- a wealth of information contained in the capital markets, which
is central to the examination of this issue. Expressed in very simple terms,
by comparing market and book values, we can determine if the firm-has managed
to create or destroy worth to its shareholders. WIen the firm profitability
is above the cost of capital, its market value should exceed its book value,
and we can safely say that worth has been created. If, on the contrary, the
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profitability does not exceed the cost of apital, the market value is
below the book value and we conclude that worth has been destroyed. Fruhan
(1979) has performed an interesting empirical study to identify the characteristics
of firms which have shown extraordinary capabilities to create value for their
shareholders.
At the corporate level, the estimated market value of the firm can be
contrasted against the actual value observed in the market, thus obtaining some
support for the cost of capital and volatility figures being used in its deriva-
tion. The challenge is now to translate the capital-market driven measures of
financial performance to the business level of the firm.
The value of the firm's stock is determined by the -contribution of the
totality of its businesses. Obviously, some of the business might contribute
to create value while others might subtract from the value of the firm. At
the same time, the cost of capital for each business is not the same, since
each one of them has its own inherent risk characteristics. This task is further
complicated by the need to assign an equitable share of the total cost of debt
borne by the corporation. Moreover, we lack now an external indicator as clear
as the market value of the stock to determine how the external capital market
is evaluating the contribution of each business. The best we can do to estimate
the value of a given unit is to discount the expected future cash flows generated
by that business, using as cost of capital the discount rate applied by the
market to other firms or entire industries of similar risk.
The final task that has to be executed in this step of the planning process
is the development of meaningful performance measurements to facilitate the-m
controlling and monitoring of the broad and specific action programs supporting
business and funcational strategies. We have commented already upon the need
to define specific action programs in a way that permits its control. A more
difficult task is to establish control and reward systems for measuring and
compensating the effective implementation of long term strategic directions,
11
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represented by the successful completion of broad action programs of business
and functions.
Steps 10, 11, and 12: Strategic and Operational Budgeting
The result of this planning process leads toward the development of an
"intelligent budget", which is not a mere extrapolation of the past into the
future, but it is an instrument that contains both strategic and operational
commitments. Strategic commitments lead to the development of new opportunities
which very often introduce significant changes in the existing business conditions.
Operational commitments, on the other hand, are aimed at the effective maintenance
of the existing business base.
A way to break this dichotomy within the budget is to make use of strategic
funds and operational funds to distinguish the role that those financial resources
will have.
Budgeting was the first structured methodology to provide assistance to
managers in the planning process; therefore, there is a great deal of solid
knowledge residing in most organizations on how to prepare agood master budget
(Welsch, 1976). The new concept that has emerged in recent years has been
the insistence in separating strategic from operational budgets, in order to
sharpen and make more controllable the strategic commitments of the firm.
The Merits of Corporate Strategic Planning
The framework we have presented to identify the essence of corporate
strategic planning has very strong and powerful contributions to enhance mana-
gesrial understanding and decision making. Among the most salient accomplishments
we could cite the following:
1) The planning process helps to unify corporate directions. By starting the
process with a proper articulation of the vision of the firn, subsequently
extended by the mission of each business, and the recognition of functional
competences, the planning process mobilizes all of the key managers in the
III
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pursuit of agreed upon and shared objectives. This unifying thrust could
be very hard to accomplish without the formalization and discipline of a
systematic process.
2) The segmentation of the firm is greatly improved. Organizational theory
has always had as a central concern the assignment and proper coordination
of tasks to the members of a firm. Rather than relying on simple operational
motifs, the strategic planning process contributes a significant enrichment
to the firm segmentation by addressing the recognition of the various
strategic hierarchical levels and its matching with the organizational
structure. A key determinant of this process is not only to seek business
autonomy oriented toward serving external markets, but it is also the
recognition that shared resources and shared concerns must be truly accom-
plished to realize all the potentials for the firm.
3) The planning process introduces a discipline for long-term thinking in the
firm. The nature of the managerial tasks is so heavily dependent on taking
care of an extraordinary amount of routine operational duties, that unless a
careful discipline is instituted, the managerial time could entirely be
devoted to-operational issues. By enforcing upon the organization a logical
process of thinking, with a clearly defined sequence of tasks linked to a
calendar, planning raises the vision of all key managers making them face
the need to concentrate creatively some efforts in reflecting upon the
strategic direction of the businesses.
4) The planning process has an educational purpose. Perhaps the most important
of the attributes of a formal strategic planning process is that it allows
the development of a managerial competence of the key members of the firm,
by enriching their common understanding of corporate objectives and busi-
nesses, and the way in which those objectives can be transformed into
reality. In other words, the most important contribution of the planning
process is the process itself. A mere by-product is the final content of
* . . . .·
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the "planning book". The engaging communicational efforts, the multiple
interpersonal negotiations generated, the need to understand and articulate
the primary factors affecting the business, and the required personal
involvement in the pursuit of constructive answers to the pressing business
questions, is what truly makes the planning process a most vital experience.
The Limitations of Corporate Strategic Planning
In spite of the many contributions of corporate strategic planning, as in
any human endeavor, it has some limitations that, if not properly recognized,
could destroy its effectiveness.
1) Risk of Excessive Bureaucratization.
One of the inherent risks in formalizing any process is to create conditions
which impose a bureaucratic burden into an organization, stifling creativity, and
losing the sense of the primary objectives intended by that process. Planning
could become an end in itself, and pretty soon could be transformed into a
meaningless game of filling-in the numbers, impairing strategic alertness, which
is the central concern of planning.
There is an issue about being able to maintain strong vitality and interest
in a process which is time-consuming and repetitive. Often, the initial stages
of introducing a well-conceived planning process in an organization is accom-
panied with an exhilarating challenge generating a strong personal commitment
and enthusiasm. As time goes by, the threat of the planning process becoming
a routine bureaucratic activity is very real.
There are several ways to prevent this undesirable situation. One is
not to force a revision of all the steps of the planning process outlined in
this writing; instead, one might conduct a comprehensive and extensive strategic
audit, say every five years., and in the interim deal simply with minor upgrading
of strategies and programs.
Another approach is to identify selectively each year the planning units
that deserve more careful attention in the planning process, either because
I  _ ______11_1_11_11_______ _-_
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of changes in environmental conditions, or due to internal organizational issues.
This discriminatory emphasis could help to avoid spending unnecessary efforts on
businesses which do not require such attention.
A third organizational device to present bureaucratization is to select
each year a planning theme which will require the attention of all key managers
in their annual planning effort. Gluck et al (1980), provide examples of possi-
ble themes: international businesses, new manufacturing process technologies,
the value of the firm products to customers, and alternative channels of distri-
bution.
With regard to the objections raised about the danger of stifling innovation
by institutionalizing the planning process, Haggerty (1981), the late President
of Texas Instruments, argues very convincingly that institutionalization is the
cost we have to pay for durability and staying power of an idea. Commeting on
the Objectives-Strategies-Tactics (OST) System at TI, he expressed:
What Texas Instruments' OSI system does is to provide the management
with the mechanism for identifying, selecting, and pursuing the
strategies and tactics which are to attain the objectives sought.
What organizational learning achieves is the building into the culture
of the organization the process and the attitudes conceived by one
* or a fe~w key individuals who fill a leadership role through a fraction
of the overall lifetime of the institution and so extend the ideas
and the processes and the attitudes of these key leaders beyond the
span of either influence or time they could attain as individuals.
Such an extension and span in time is essentially what organizational
learning is all about.
2) Lack of an Integration with Other Formal Management Systems.
Planning cannot be viewed as an isolated activity. Rather, it is part
of a set of formal managerial processes and systems whose aim is to improve
the understanding of managers in identifying and executing the organizational
tasks.
. There is an inherent danger in organizations which decide to implement
its strategic planning process with a heavy planning department. Although
there are legitimate activities that it could undertake, such as collecting
the external information, serve as catalyst in the planning process, offer
; . . . e........ ....
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logistical support for the conduction of the planning process, and assuming an
educational role to facilitate the understanding of the planning methodology,
it is crucial to understand that planning is done by line executives and not
by planners. Moreover, the establishment of heavy planning departments might
tend to isolate the planning process from the mainstream of managerial decisions.
Strategic Management, the next stage in the evolution of planning systems,
is the response that is being offered today as a way to integrate all managerial
capabilities within corporate values and corporate culture to assure effective
strategic thinking at all levels in the organization.
3) Grand Design vs. Logical Incrementalism.
A question that has been raised is whether creative strategic thinking
can ever emerge from a formal disciplined process. Some go even further and
question whether it is desirable to commit to a rational grand scheme as a way
of projecting the organization forward. A leading scholar who casts a serious
doubt about the merits of formal planning is James Brian Quinn (1980, 1981).
He regards formal planning as an important building block in a continously
evolving structure of analytical and political events that combine to determine
overall strategy. However, he states that the actual process used to arrive
at a total strategy is usually fragmented, evolutionary, and largely intuitive.
He claims that in well-run organizations managers proactively guide streams
of actions and events incrementally toward a strategy embodying many of the
principles of formal strategies. But top executives rarely design their overall
strategy, or even major segments of them, in the formal planning cycle of the
corporation. Instead they use a series of incremental processes which build
strategies largely at more disaggregated levels, and then integrate these sub-
system strategies step by step for the total corporation. The rationale behind
this kind of incremental strategy formulation is so powerful that it, rather
than the formal system planning approach, seems to provide an improved normative
model for strategic decision-making.
___
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We believe that the notion of logistical incrementalism is not necessarily
contradictory to a well-conceived corporate strategic planning process. By
that we mean a process which is supported in the corporate values of the organi-
zation, that is participatory in character, which has a sense of vision driven
from the top, but shared by all key managers, which allows for meaningful nego-
tiations to take place within an organizational framework. This process does
not blindly set up long-term objectives, but rather expresses a sense of
desired long-term direction and is incrementally attempting to adjust its
course of action with a strategic posture in mind.
4) Formal Planning vs. Opportunistic Planning.
Formal planning systems represent an organized way of identifying and
coordinating the major tasks of the organization. If all the planning capa-
bilities were to be dependent entirely on the formal planning structure, the
firm would be in a highly vulnerable position, unable to face unexpected events
not properly foreseen within the assumptions underlying the strategy formulation
process. Therefore, coexisting with formal planning, there is another form of
planning referred to as opportunistic planning. In Figure 6 a comparison is
presented on the characteristics of formal and opportunistic planning.
Figure 6: The Characteristics of Formal and Opportunistic Planning
Formal Opportunistic
Planning Planning
Timing System process that Responses to unexpected emer-
follows a prescribed gencies of opportunities and
calendar threats
Scope Corporate-wide Usually concentrated on a seg-
ment of the corporation
Purpose Attempts to develop a coor- It is based on existing capa-
diated and proactive adap- bilities that permit slack
tation to the external and flexibility to respond to
environment, while seeking unplanned events
internal effectiveness
and efficiency
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Since opportunistic planning is triggered by unexpected events and it is
concentrated normally in a more narrow segment of the corporate activities,
it seems unlikely that the triggering event affects all the businesses of the
corporation. The key capability that is essential for the prompt. response to
the external event is the existence of slack. Often, organizations assign
untapped financial resources to be quckly mobilized at the discretion of the
corresponding manager to meet the unforeseen emergency. This is a form of
financial slack. More important, it is what we might call an organizational
slack. By that we mean the availability of human resources which are not
overaly burdened by their program commitments, so that they can absorb addi-
tional duties without experiencing a severe organizational constraint.
There is a need to balance the weight of these-two coexisting planning
processes. In organizations which rely exclusively on formal planning, they
could trap themselves into unbearable rigidities. On the other hand, a firm
whose dec'ision making capbaility rests entirely on improved opportunistic schemes,
will be constantly reacting to external forces, without having a clear sense of
direction. The answer lies in a good compromise between these two extremes.
Formal planning, providing a permanent strategic framework, without binding
very action of the enterprise, while opportunistic planning allowing for
creative responses to be made within that organized framework.
The development of the managerial knowledge and talent required to exercise
effectively the opportunistic planning task is in itself a demanding job, which
is the essence of the organizational learning issues that were addressed in
the previous comments we quoted from Haggerty.
5) A Calendar-Driven Planning Process is Not the Only Form of a Formal
Planning System.
Implicit in the sequence of steps that we used t dcscriba t he formal
corporate strategic planning process was the notion of a calendar-driven system.
In fact, many American corporations have adopted variations of this type of
irm  -i-----^---- ___
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planning approach. However, this is not the only way of addressing a disciplined
formalization of the planning activities. The most important alternative to
the calendar-driven system is a program-period planning process, instituted in
organizations such as IBM and Texas Instruments.
The essence of this process consists in allowing for program initiatives
to be generated at any time during the year, as opposed to waiting for the pre-
scribed timing in which broad and specific strategic action programs are supposed
to be formulated. However, it is necessary, at a given point in time, to conso-
lidate all the program proposals into a meaningful integrated document. This is
what is referred to as period planning. As noted in the IBM Corporation Background
Note (Harvard Business School, 1979), an IBM executive remarks: "Strategic decisions
are often made in a formal process, but are made visible in an integrated way in
the period process". Also it is stated in the' some note that period planning
then becomes a mechanism for adding up all the bottoms-up generated technical
and business activities which are part of the program planning to be sure they
make a consistent all.
Program-period planning processes are specially suited for organizations
which face a hh degree of technical complexity with a rapid pace of change
dealing primarily with an integrated business, such as IBM and TI. In those
cases, program planning is focused on either product development or productivity
improvements in a functional area; while period planning is characterized by
its regular, calendar-driven sequence of events.
Conclusion
There is no unique way to plan, and there is more than one way to plan
effectively. ?the type of business, the managerial competence, the intensity
of competition, and the turbulence in the environment call for a planning
system coherent with this reality. Moreover, business firms should tailor
their systems to fit their corporate culture, organizational structure, and
-41-
administrative processes.
A firm does have an appropriate planning system in place when its degree
of planning competence matches the degree of complexity of the firm. The
environmental changes of the 1970's and 1980's are forcing firms to consider
a more comprehensive form of planning, like the corporate planning forecast
described in this paper.
-.----.·.-11--11il___:__..._.
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